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Global Democracy or Global Law:
Which Comes First?
BENJAMIN R. BARBER*
This has been an extraordinary week; it started on Monday with an
after-breakfast visit from President Clinton at the Whitman Center at
Rutgers, and it has culminated this evening in a dinner with your great
chancellor, Hermann Wells. I am delighted then to be with you for this
sesquicentennial of your great law school apd to join with this group of
distinguished lawyers and social scientists to talk about the globalization of
law. I have only one problem: there is no globalization of law. Law has
always been the destitute camp follower of the itinerant armies of
transnationalism-traditionally, imperialism, communism, international
commercialism, or markets; today, telecommunications, ecology, markets,
and pop culture. Law is dragged along behind these forces in the most
awkward fashion. The image I have before me is not of a man pulling a
somewhat reluctant dog along a smooth path, but of a helicopter hauling a
puppy on a long tether across an obstacle course on the ground. The
chopper sails along, but the poor puppy dog ....
There are those who would point to the law of the seas, human rights,
space law, the new thrust toward global environmental regulation (the
Montreal or Rio treaties, for example), or, most persuasively, to the role of
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in fostering European integration. The
ECJ has in fact been well ahead of the region's political institutions. Yet
events in Europe since Maastricht suggest the continuing priority of national
sovereignty over what remains in almost every realm as "soft law" or no
law at all. Hobbes continues to frame the discussion of international law.
Law for the purposes of nations is the capacity for enforcement; for
sovereign nations its essence lies in its sanctions. Covenants without the
sword are still but words, of no use at all to secure man or nations.
There are nonetheless powerful forces of globalization at work in the
modem world, and they are drawing law along behind them. Indeed, as you
know, it is the purpose of this conference to try to influence, a little bit, the
* Director, Walt Whitman Center for the Culture and Politics of Democracy, Rutgers University.
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direction in which law, drawn on by other forces, will go. In almost every
recent article that I have read in the international law journals, there is an
urgent discussion of how boundaries are being transcended or
annihilated-not by globalizing law but rather by ecological, commercial,
or technological trends that demand globalizing law, or at least effective
international regulation. Thus, Maurice Strong, for example, pleads, "What
is needed is recognition of the reality that in many fields, especially
environmental issues, it is simply not feasible for sovereignty to be
exercised unilaterally by individual nation-states."' But of course power is
exercised precisely in this way, and hence, as Oscar Schachter complains,
environmental law has in fact remained almost entirely "soft-composed of
principles and standards of conduct not clearly accepted as obligatory and
uncertain in application."2
Geoffrey Palmer sounds downright desperate in a recent essay, in which
he confesses: "[W]e lack the institutional and legal mechanisms to deal
effectively with transboundary and biospheric environmental degradation.
... As matters stand, we lack many of the necessary rules and the means
for devising them, we lack institutions capable of ensuring that the rules we
have are effective."3 International law in 1993 is all pleading, a rhetoric of
"must," "should," and "ought to," rather than a language of action. The rule
of law across boundaries would not then seem to represent the road to
globalization, though it may eventually become a consequence of it.
Sovereignty, so porous in other areas, remains an obstacle blocking the
application of law across borders-thus my embarrassment. However, the
defect of law points us in the right direction: democracy. While historically
the rule of law often preceded and set the framework for the emergence of
democracy (as happened in England), nowadays, at the global level,
democratization is likely to precede the establishment of the rule of law.
In order to provide a fuller frame for this discussion, let me address the
impact of those trends that are globalizing-the tendencies that law shadows
but never leads--on democratization. Since, as I hope to show, the rule of
law (understood as something more than regulation) is fostered by
1. Maurice F. Strong, ECO '92: Critical Challenges and Global Solutions, 44 J. INT'L. AFF.
287, 298 (1991).
2. Oscar Schachter, The Emergence of International Environmental Law, 44 J. INT'L AFF. 457,
457 (1991).
3. Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT'L L.
259, 259 (1992) (citation omitted).
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democratic cultures, tracing the trajectory of democratization may offer some
clue as to the possibilities of international law.
By democracy, I mean not just a form of government or even a kind of
civil society; rather, I have in mind what Dewey understood as a "way of
life." Walt Whitman poses the crucial question: "Did you, too, 0 friend,
suppose democracy was only for elections, for politics, and for a party
name? I say democracy is only of use there that it may pass on and come
to its flower and fruits in manners, in the highest forms of interactions
between men, and their beliefs-in religion, literature, colleges, and
schools-democracy in all public and private life."4
Do the forces of globalization, dragging law behind them, enhance
democracy-which could make law's journey so much easier? Far from it.
The relationship between globalization and democracy, even in its thinnest
governmental form, is weak, and in some ways, even contradictory.
Moreover, globalization represents only one of two kinds of forces
exercising an influence on the nation-state and on democracy.
As I suggested in an article in The Atlantic last year, there are not one
but two specters haunting Europe:
The first is a retribalization of large swaths of humankind by war
and bloodshed: a threatened Lebanonization of national states in
which culture is pitted against culture, people against people, tribe
against tribe-a Jihad in the name of a hundred narrowly conceived
faiths against every kind of interdependence, every kind of artificial
social cooperation and civic mutuality. The second is being borne
in on us by the onrush of economic and ecological forces that
demand integration and uniformity and that mesmerize the world
with fast music, fast computers, and fast food-with MTV,
Macintosh, and McDonald's, pressing nations into one commercially
homogenous global network: one McWorld tied together by
technology, ecology, communications, and commerce. The planet
is falling precipitantly apart and coming reluctantly together at the
very same moment.5
4. WALT WHITMAN, DEMOCRATIC VISTAS 29-30 (Liberal Arts Press 1949) (n.d.).
5. Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad versus McWorld, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 1992, at 53. 53.
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Neither democratization nor law have benefitted much from either trend.
And in recent months, the forces of retribalization seem to have gained the
upper hand in their contest with McWorld. Talk of international law seems
almost risible in the context of Bosnia, Iraq, or Somalia. England, France,
Germany, and other continental nations were once relatively homogenous.
They were nation-states in the nineteenth century sense, with a shared
language, culture, history, and religion. In their early history, nationalism
was actually a force of integration binding together Burgandians, Normans,
and Provencals into a greater France.
Today, these peoples are increasingly fractious and
disintegrative-multicultural with a vengeance. The language of tribes has
become commonplace in international politics, as new books by Daniel
Patrick Moynihan (called aptly, Pandemonium) and Joel Kotkin make
clear.6  The United Kingdom-sceptred isle, blessed plot and all-has
absorbed large and increasingly inassimilable populations from its ex-
commonwealth: up to one million Hindus and up to two million Muslims,
who, when they are not being abused by their hosts, are warring with one
another. Since the Second World War, France, hospitable as ever to its
French Community ex-colonials, has accommodated over five million
citizens from the Maghreb along with many others from French West Africa
and the West Indies. The French are no longer sure whether their historical
commitment to civic assimilation can work in the face of this resurgent and
often angry Muslim culture that no longer is willing to be integrated into a
Mother France. Germany is in a fearful tumult with a volume of
immigrants that has led to globally reported skinhead excesses.
German developments are eerily reminiscent of the 1920s, suggesting
both the radical polarization that destroyed Weimar and the weak state
response for which its pallid and legalistic constitution was notorious. Who
can predict whether Germany can even absorb its "cousins" from East
Germany as "natives," let alone the flood tide of immigrants from further
east? The refugee problem, truly a global challenge, is putting post war
German tolerance to a very expensive trial, one whose outcome remains
quite uncertain (although there has been a welcome civic response from
ordinary Germans who, in candlelight demonstrations attended by hundreds
6. JOEL KoTKIN, TRIBES: How RACE, RELIGION AND IDENTITY DETERMINE SUCCESS IN THE
NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY (1993); DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, PANDEMONIUM: ETHNICITY IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1993).
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of thousands, have protested against rightist radicalism). Even Switzerland,
Europe's traditional standing tribute to sustained multicultural nationalism,
is at risk, its Francophone and Germanic populations angrily divided over
the new relationship to Europe. In the autumn of 1992, a substantial
majority of German speakers, aligned against any deepening of the
relationship to the new Europe, outvoted and thereby outraged the French
speakers, nearly eighty percent of whom had voted to strengthen the
European connection. While the dismantling of the Helvetic Confederation
(founded in 1848 in its modem form) is not at hand, Switzerland's troubles
bode well neither for Swiss multiculturalism nor for a united Europe.
Strife-ridden ex-nations like the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia,
Liberia, and Czechoslovakia offer their own peculiar pathogenic versions of
American multicultural development, and some believe that the experience
of the United States as an embattled, but relatively successful, multicultural
society cries out today for careful attention in Europe. By the same token,
the toxicity of cultural rifts in Europe may give pause to Americans who
think cultural difference is exclusively an occasion for celebration and who
tend to disregard the warnings of those like Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. who
worry about the fragility of American unity.7 The startling fact is that less
than ten percent of the modem world's states are truly homogenous, and in
only half is there a single ethnic group that comprises even seventy-five
percent of the population! Multiculturalism is the rule, homogeneity the
exception. Fractiousness, rather than national integration, has become the
defining experience of new "nations."
Indeed, even the world's more traditionally homogeneous integral
nations have good reason to examine the relationship among globalism,
multiculturalism, and democracy. The increasing economic and
communications interdependence of the world means that such nations,
however unified internally, must nonetheless operate in an increasingly
multicultural global environment. Ironically, a world that is coming together
culturally and commercially is a world whose discrete subnational ethnic,
religious, and racial parts are also far more in evidence. Forced into
incessant contact, post modem nations cannot sequester their idiosyncracies.
Europe after Maastricht, while it falls well short of earlier ambitions, has
7. ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.
1992) (1991).
8. Joseph S. Nye, WASH. POST, Dec. 21-27, 1992 (Weekly Edition), at 28.
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become integrated enough to force a continent-wide multicultural awareness,
but the consequences of that awareness have hardly been unifying. The
more "Europe" hoves into view, the more reluctant and self-aware its
reluctant national constituents become. What Giinter Grass said of
Germany--"unified, the Germans were more disunited than ever"-applies
in spades to Europe: integrated, it is more disintegral than ever.9
I have already noted the irony concealed in the revival of nationalism
in the post nationalist world. Nationalism was initially a force for
unification in Europe; it smashed the great empires of Rome and Germany
at the same time that it attacked and then brought together the rival clans,
tribes, and feudal vassalage that had supported an universal empire in its
local manifestations under the figment of a larger territorial nation, bound
together by language and culture, if not blood and kinship. England
emerged as a unity out of a hundred years of factional strife (the War of the
Roses), just as France found its identity in the nationalist heroics of Jeanne
D'Arc.
But having won its victories of integration and sustained integral states
for several hundred years, nationalism in time changed its strategy,
becoming a divisive force in the territories it once helped tie together. Back
in the 1920s, in his The Revolt of the Masses, Jos& Ortega y Gasset observed
how, during periods of consolidation, nationalism tends to be a unifier with
a "positive value," while in less coherent periods it becomes fractious and
negative, a kind of identity "mania."10  In its unifying phase, where it
precipitated a powerful concept of integral sovereignty, it impeded
international law by limiting enforcement to the positive law of national
sovereigns. In its divisive modern form, it impedes law per se, by its
defiance of all transtribal norms.
Above, I noted that this renewed mania for difference and tribal identity,
so redolent of the 1920s, can be associated with tendencies to Jihad:
religious and cultural war in the name of difference." Daniel Patrick
Moynihan has predicted that the next half hundred states likely to come into
existence over the next fifty years will all be defined by ethnic
conflict-that is to say, by civil war. 2 The United Nations currently has
9. Maria Stone, Nationalism and Identity in (Former) East Germany, TiKKUN, Nov.-Dec. 1992,
at 41, 44 (quoting Giinter Grass).
10. JOSt ORTEGA Y GASSET, THE REVOLT OF THE MASSES 183 (W.W. Norton 1957).
11. Barber, supra note 5.
12. Aleksa Djilas, A House Divided, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 25, 1993, at 38, 42 (citing Daniel
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peace-keeping forces in thirteen countries-in nearly every case, arrayed
against forces of domestic insurrection and civil discord. 3 The aim of
most small-scale wars today is precisely to redraw boundaries in order to
divide-say in Kurdish Iraq, Sudan, or Serbian populated sections of
Croatia. Countries like Afghanistan, recently fighting a foreign invader in
the name of its national independence, have been effectively dismembered:
divided among Panthans, Hazaras, Usbeks, and Tajiks. They talk peace
again in these countries, but only to certify the new lines defining ethnic
particularism. Ethnic membership is thus enhanced via national
dismembership, or by expulsion of unwanted contaminators.
With eighty-three percent of the Indian population constituted by
Hindus, the radical Bharatiya Janata party has begun to call for a leadership
that is exclusively Hindu, if not for a Hindu state. Its handmaiden has been
not law but terror, and its armed radical wing, Shiv Shen, has shown a
preference for assassinations and bombs as extreme as the Basque
nationalists or the IRA. Egypt's eight million Copts (out of a total
population of fifty-six million) are under attack, and not exclusively from
fundamentalist Muslims. In the Baltic States, the movement to
disenfranchise ethnic Russians could lead in time to their effective
expulsion. Estonia is only sixty-two percent Estonian and in Latvia,
Latvians constitute a bare majority, with its capital, Riga, only twenty-seven
percent Latvian.' 4  The expulsion of nonnatives here would obviously
cause massive dislocations.
In other countries, the problem is ethnic populations that overflow the
borders of their countries. The Serbian and Kurdish cases are well known,
but it is perhaps Hungary that presents the gravest potential source of
instability. Following the 1920 Trianon Peace Treaty completing the
breakup of the old Empire, Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory. Its
population fell from nearly twenty million to seven and a half million,
leaving almost three and a half million Hungarians outside Hungary's post-
war borders (five million today), scattered through Romania, Slovakia, and
Patrick Moynihan).
13. U.N. troops are on the borders between Israel and its hostile neighbors, on the frontiers
dividing India and Pakistan and Iraq and Kuwait. But they are inside of Cyprus, Lebanon, Angola, El
Salvador, the Western Sahara, former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Somalia, and Mozambique. U.N.
Peacekeeping Operations to Date, REUTERS, Sept. 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
14. Steven Erlanger, In the Baltics, There May Be No Home for Russians, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22,
1992, at AI, A4.
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Serbia, where they are both organizing their own secessionist movements
and are subjects of continuing persecution by dominant ethnic majorities in
those countries. The vice-president of the ruling Hungarian Democratic
Forum, Istvan Csurka, has openly talked about the need for "Hungarian
living space" (lebensraum).5
The recognition of Macedonia as a state threatens to draw Turkey and
Greece into the kind of confrontation that already characterizes their
interface in Cyprus. The sensitivity of the issues is clear from the debate
about whether it actually should be named Macedonia, as if its raw
nationalist scent could be concealed by calling it something other than a raw
nationalist rose. 6 As traditional multicultural nation-states are destabilized,
subnationalist movements have a nightmarish tendency to crop up like
cancerous cells within cancerous cells, each anarchic fragment threatening
to destroy the larger segments of which it is a nominal part. Russia's
secession from the Soviet Union was scarcely completed when Northern
Ossetia became an internal problem for Russia. Since then, the Ingush
minority (less than ten percent of North Ossetia's population of 650,000) has
risen against the Ossetians, with Russian troops trying at once to keep the
two factions from each others' throats and to preserve the unity of Mother
Russia from the secessionist inclinations of both. Yeltsin's deputy
administrator in Vladikavkaz has said "the task is to make a man forget his
memories"'T-a task about as promising as pursuing universal peace by
announcing that the task is to get men to give up their will to aggression.
This is certainly not a task for lawyers.
If not law, then what? The civil religion that undergirds the rule of
law? Perhaps. My question here then -becomes: Is it possible that
America's constitutional faith proffers a solution to Europe's recidivist
tribalisms? Is there an equivalent of constitutional faith for India, Nigeria,
Yugoslavia, or Somalia that would pull the tribes off each other and nurture
a framework for political unity? In America, constitutional faith has lost its
novel artificial look. It is anything but legalistic. Rather, it has become
15. Anna Husarska, Budapest Postcard: His Kampf THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 30, 1992, at 10,
10.
16. Of about two million inhabitants, 67% are Macedonian (Greek Orthodox), 20% are Albanian
Muslims, 4.5% are Turks, 2.3% are Serbs, and 2.3% are gypsies. Henri Guirehoun, LE NOUVEL
OBSERVATEUR, Nov. 19-25, 1992, at 39.
17. Dorinda Elliott and Steve LeVine, An Ethnic Nightmare in the Caucasus, NEWSWEEK, Dec.
7, 1992, at 34, 34.
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conventional. Like an old shoe, it fits comfortably and its wearers need not
examine too carefully how it was cobbled or whether its origins are
legitimate or rooted in civil codes.
But beyond American shores, constitutional faith has to be manufactured
afresh each time a fractious nation-state tries to dissuade its fragments from
flying apart. In the absence of a history of commitment to common civil
practices, such an aridly secular faith is unlikely to draw much fealty. The
mere promulgation of a faith is unlikely to establish a civil religion. And
what is its substance to be? Who is the "We" in Europe's or India's or
Russia's "We the people"? Are the common principles exclusively
commercial and technological, as Eurocrats in Strasburg and Bruxelles often
intimate? Or is there a potential civic element as well? For example,
democracy?
I. OLD IDEOLOGIES AND A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH
In truth, old memories linger on, poisoning every attempt at establishing
new forms of artificial unity, defeating those who would weave the pieces
together with the thread of law. There were once colonial and neocolonial
alternatives to constitutional faith--effective, if costly, antidotes to ethnic
factionalism-but their time is past. Ethnic nationalism was frequently kept
in check and the politics of difference offset by imperialism in both its
capitalist-colonialist and its neocolonialist-communist variants.
Ironically, these two versions of civic faith have themselves been rival
ideologies for the last one hundred years, not least of all during the Cold
War. Yet both communism and capitalism hoped to unify the peoples over
whom it sought dominion through the imposition of radical economic
secularism, whether in the form of transnational capital markets or
transnational proletarian rule. The cry "Workers of the world unite!," like
the call for free trade and open markets, is always a threat to ethnic identity.
Imperialist economic strategies (whether statist or market), however odious
they might have been, did keep rival ethnic factions in check. The great
nineteenth century empires, rooted in economic rather than ethnic suzerainty,
held together quite astonishing coalitions of peoples who were naturally at
odds. They also offered common civil codes, common courts, and common
laws, even though their codes were sanctioned by authoritarian rather than
democratic force.
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The Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian, and the Russian empires were
among the most inclusive associations of peoples the world has known, at
least since the time of the Roman Empire. Whatever their depredations with
respect to liberty, rights, and self-determination, they did inhibit the
centrifugal instincts of the multiple tribes and factions they held together
through a combination of coercion, civility, and economic interest, and they
inoculated the nineteenth century against large-scale war (if not revolution)
in a manner that has been the envy of our own sanguine century. Indeed,
the colonial empires built by the Europeans in Africa were studiously
oblivious to local tribes and peoples to an extent that fairly exterminated all
boundaries organized around identity. A modem map of Africa reveals
colonial, now ex-colonial, statist aggregations that ignore natural tribal
frontiers altogether-albeit today it is precisely these occluded frontiers
which have become the fissure lines for Africa's multiplying interstate
tensions and civil wars. The Vance-Owen map proposing a settlement for
Bosnia is a tortured attempt to bring frontiers into accord with ethnic
boundaries so minute that not even The New York Times can get them right
(it published erroneous versions twice in the winter of 1993).
Communism played a similar role in holding together the old Russian
empire after its dissolution, keeping the lid on secessionist and fractious
sentiments among the nationalities by the ruthless imposition of a secular
ideology of collectivism. It was perhaps only a tribute to Machiavelli, who
counseled, "[I]t is better to be feared than loved," but in the Soviet Union,
communism as both carrot and stick, lion (force) and fox (stealth), worked
against domestic insurrection for over seventy years. Even in Eastern
Europe and the Baltics, where communism came as an entirely alien
intrusion imposed by force, it kept rival peoples from one another's throats
for at least forty years.
The rapid disintegration of whatever unity had been achieved in the
Baltics, Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union reveals both how
important to continuing transnational unity the victory of communist
imperialism was and how Pyrrhic, in the long run, it turned out to be.
What, then, is left that can bind together multiethnic and multireligious
societies? Neither liberals concerned with individual rights and the rule of
law, nor communitarians interested in local democracy, are happy with the
choices. No one wishes to support the classical nineteenth century liberal
principle of self-determination which achieved its acme after World War I
in President Wilson's dream of a planet of self-determining nations, for fear
[Vol. 1: 119
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of underwriting global balkanization. President Wilson's own Secretary of
State, Robert L. Lansing, failed to share the President's enthusiasm, asking
whether self-determination would not "breed discontent, disorder and
rebellion? The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes
which can never be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives. What
a calamity that the phrase was ever uttered! What misery it will cause!"' 8
No wonder that even Amitai Etzioni, an ardent supporter of
communitarianism today, worries about the "evils of self-determination,"' 9
while Joseph S. Nye editorializes for The Washington Post about "the Self--
Determination Trap ... ."'0 And in the final instance, the rule of global
law will have to follow from, rather than initiate, some form of global
politics.
The capitalist market remains an alternative of sorts: I have already
alluded to "McWorld"-those economic and ecological forces that are
pressing nations into one commercially homogenous global network-a
McWorld tied together by technology, ecology, communications, and
commerce. McWorld certainly remains Jihad's most formidable rival, and
in the long run, it may even manage to attenuate the force of the globe's
current recidivist tribalisms.
McWorld is ecological and technological, but most of all it is a product
of popular culture driven by expansionist commerce. Its template is
American. Its form is style, though it is style as produce to be sold for a
profit. Its goods are as much images as material, an aesthetic as well as a
product line. Thus it is about culture as commodity, and apparel as
ideology. Music, theater, books, films, and video are all construed as image
exports creating a common world taste around common logos, advertising
slogans, starts, jingles, trademarks, videos, and celebrities. It is a new world
of global franchises where, in place of the old cry "Workers of the world
unite! You have nothing to lose but your chains," is heard the new cry
"Consumers of the world unite! You have everything to gain from our
chains!"
18. David Binder, As Ethnic Wars Multiply, U.S. Strives for a Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1993,
at Al, Al (quoting Robert L. Lansing). Of course Lansing was no friend of Wilson's vision, and
actually worked to undermine aspects of his policies. See generally THOMAS J. KNOCK, To END ALL
WARS: WOODROW WILSON AND THE QUEST FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER (1992).
19. Amitai Etzioni, The Evils of Self-Determination, 89 FOREIGN POL'Y 21 (Winter 1992-1993).
20. Joseph S. Nye, supra, note 8, at 28.
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McWorld brings with it an extraordinary new Esperanto. In nearly
every country in the world, in the most remote towns, you can hear the new
global language: Nike. Madonna. Coke. Michael Jackson. Toys 'R Us.
McDonald's. Tina Turner. MTV. Sly Stallone. CNN. Madonna. The
Dream Team. Levi's. Wendy's. Pepsi. Michael Jordan. Taco Bell.
Dunkin' Donuts. Madonna. Madonna. Madonna. What was once a symbol
of the universal Roman Catholic Church is now a symbol of the universal
American pop cultural temple: Madonna, Madonna, Madonna.
Like Dewey's democracy, global culture's McWorld is a way of life, a
style for everyman and everywoman-a style, of course, that must be
purchased. Even the staid New York Times, ever on top of what is fit to
print, has introduced a "Style" section among its multiplying Sunday
supplements.
The past dozen years have changed the face of the globe, erasing
national cultural distinctions. In Japan in 1992, the number one restaurant
by volume of customers was McDonald's. Number two was the Colonel's
Kentucky Fried Chicken. In France, they talk now of the Sixi~me
Rbpublique, adding quickly, "la Republique Americaine." And Jacques
Lang, longtime cultural minister who only a decade ago was cursing
"franglais" and its mangling of authentic French and calling for legislation
to protect the French language, in 1992 saw fit to bestow upon Mr. Rocky
himself, Sylvester Stallone, the Chevalier des arts et lettres. In Bombay,
even as fanatic Hindu extremists murder Muslims, over 100,000 upper class
homes are wired with cable so that their inhabitants can receive satellite
transmissions from TNT and CNN, pretending that their true country is the
world.
In England, where football (soccer) and cricket once dominated weekend
television, viewers now can watch the NFL Game of the Week, and even in
France there is an American football jeu de semaine, complete with an
American born announcer whose breathless description of plays, rendered
in an intentionally atrocious American accent, runs on, "alors, quelle finesse!
Regardez le quarterbacksneak de Dan Marino, 9a marche vraiment
parfaitment, n'est pas?"
In Budapest, they are watching "The Cosby Show" on rerun-but in
German, since Magyar dubbing is not yet available. Back in the 1980s,
"The Cosby Show" was a favorite among white South African viewers; how
far behind could the dismantling of Apartheid be? Coca Cola now makes
thirty-six percent of its profits outside of the United States, while
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McDonald's now has nearly one third of its 12,000 franchises abroad, with
almost 400 in Japan. At the beginning of 1993, the number one film in a
dozen foreign countries was "The Bodyguard," a film as atrocious as it was
profitable.
In Yeltsin's Russia, T.V. viewers can watch a rip-off of "Wheel of
Fortune" called "Field of Wonders" on which lucky winners receive Sony
VCR's with which they can view the wildly popular American films now
available on video there. Oh yes, and Pravda was just sold to a Greek
publisher.
Finally, Poland, free from tyranny, is apparently set on returning as
quickly as possible to the nineteenth century. The state recently introduced
a Church inspired ban on abortion, and the number one selling book at the
start of 1993 was Scarlett, trailed by Scarlett's prequel, Gone With the
Wind.
These extraordinary changes hasten globalization; they invite law to
regulate the anarchy of rival national markets and smooth the way for global
markets. They mandate rules that will permit human survival. But they
neither democratize nor liberalize and they can point backwards as easily as
forward.
And only in the esoteric world of rational choice theory does economic
calculation outweigh ethnic passion. Only in the imagination of advertisers
can Nikes and a Walkman prevent their wearers from murdering their
neighbors. Only in 1he small minds of political scientists who think
democracy can be established by Fed Ex-ing a copy of the Bill of Rights to
an ex-communist country with no other foundation can the rule of law be
established by the stroke of a pen. In a McWorld where sovereignty
continues to constrain the enforcers of global public goods (like law), even
as markets liberate the agents of global privatization and thus hasten the
pursuit of public "bads," we cannot really look to global commerce as a
source of liberal or legal solace, let alone democratization.
II. DEMOCRACY AND CONFEDERALISM
There may be a form of constitutional faith that responds to the new
tribalism, but it will not be a faith simply borrowed lock, stock, and barrel
from America, Switzerland, or some other successful multicultural society.
Nor will it be based on the importation of another society's civil codes. Nor
can it, in the long run, be derived from unilateral actions by superpowers
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acting as surrogates for the missing world government (the Pax Americana
idea), although this may actually attenuate the force of subversive nationality
in the short term. Civic faith depends in part precisely on its adaptability
to the circumstances and conditions of particular peoples at particular
historical moments. Attempting to paper over the fissures in ex-Yugoslavia
by importing an American civic ideology is no more likely to succeed than
attempting to prop up its democracy by importing American party
institutions. Technology transfer sometimes works; institution transfer
almost never does. Democratic institutions succeed because they are molded
to the landscape in which they are to be grounded-planted in the soil of a
well established civil society. This has been the lesson of all political theory
from Montesquieu and Rousseau to Madison and de Tocqueville, each of
whom demanded a new science of politics for a new society.
Nonetheless, there are several formal principles involved in establishing
a successful civil society that are relevant. A constitutional faith pertinent
to nations comprised of rival ethnic fragments requires a civic ideology in
which difference itself is recognized and honored. This is the secret of
Switzerland's remarkable multicultural, multiconfessional success: Italian,
though the language of only a tiny minority of Swiss, remains a national
language; Raeto-Romansch, though spoken by only a few tens of thousands
in the single canton of Graubuenden, is an official language of that
canton. 2' However stressed it may be, the Helvetic Union persists.
Second, the honoring of difference must be accompanied by some
territorial or geographical expression of it, ideally through federal or
confederal institutions. Partition destroys a civil society; federation
preserves it while acknowledging the relative autonomy of the parts. The
Owen-Vance solution for Bosnia tries to find its way between partition and
federalism, in a situation that manifests the worst case situation: hostile
ethnic groups intermingled in populations that are not geographically
discrete and nearly impossible to disentangle other than by relocation (a
euphemism for expulsion); or, as with the Owen-Vance plan, carving ethnic
"regions" into units the size of a town street or three or four adjacent houses
or apartments! In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the difficulties are
overcome by giving Muslims the short end of the stick, a politically prudent
but morally dubious solution at best, and one the Clinton administration
21. See Benjamin R. Barber, Participation and Swiss Democracy, 23 GOV'T AND OPPOSITION 30
(1988).
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initially refused to accept. In any case, solutions that do no more than try
to keep rival groupings apart are not so much dealing with, as yielding to,
bigotry and hatred-as has happened in the Balkans, where Owen-Vance is
as moribund as Sarajevo. Bloody as the American Civil War was, it was
fought in the name of union, not dissolution. Most modem civil wars are
fought by both sides in the name of partition, the point of contention being
only who gets how much of what.
Furthermore, in the American case, separation has always been a short
term tactic that belongs to a long term strategy of integration. The parts are
honored so as to strengthen their ties to the whole and demonstrate that the
ideology of the whole represents not the hegemony of one group but a
(potentially) genuine inclusiveness. Unless working together is seen as
crucial to the survival of the parts, the parts will inevitably come to view
themselves as a diaspora of some other (perhaps invisible) blood nation,
whose reconstruction will come to be seen as the only avenue to
preservation. Unhappily, the antagonism of one group may actually ignite
a defensive separatist identity in some other group that had previously seen
itself as assimilated. Thus, Bosnian and Croatian Muslims, secularized and
assimilated into Yugoslav life, have only become self-consciously Islamic
and separatist in the face of continuing aggression by their erstwhile fellow
countrymen and neighbors. Likewise, a Greek Orthodox minority that is not
respected inside of Croatia becomes a force, not only for an independent
Macedonia, but a likely candidate for Greek (and then Turkish) intervention
into Croatian affairs.
Federalism is probably too aggressive and centralist a solution for
countries as fractured as Croatia or Afghanistan. Confederalism may be
more promising. The Federalist Papers have been required reading for such
disintegrating countries; I would urge them rather to read the Articles of
Confederation. Article III of the Articles would seem to provide a relatively
modest framework for holding rival nations like the Czech Republic and
Slovakia or Serbia and Croatia together. It provides for the full autonomy
of the member states and honors their independence, but it also declares
that:
The said states hereby severally enter into a firm league of
friendship with each other, for their common defense, the security
of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare, binding
themselves to assist each other against all force offered to, or attacks
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made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion,
sovereignty, trade, or any other pretense whatever.
Article IV provides that "the free inhabitants of each" state "shall be
entitled to all the privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several
states, and the people of each state shall have free ingress and regress to and
from any other state, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and
commerce." Similar provisions held together the Helvetic Confederation
from 1291 down to 1800 when Napoleon tried in vain to impose a unitary
constitution on the recalcitrant cantons, under the guise of unified law codes
(the same ruse he used in conquering all of Europe and part of Asia). The
splintered factions of many a ruptured nation could do worse than
reconceive themselves in terms of a "firm league of friendship" around their
common liberties.
The problem remains what to do with minorities within each confederal
region. Initially, in the most volatile regions where, as in Bosnia, deeply
hostile groups are inextricably mingled (the Vance-Owen map trying to
separate them was a nightmarish yet ultimately futile exercise in
microgerrymandering), some form of external intervention will probably be
required-a security shield that protects them from civil fratricide while they
labor to establish a civil society. The shield need not necessarily be the
United Nations, which has had a mixed record in its peace-keeping efforts.
A coalition of forces like NATO, the Common Market, or a powerful
neighbor (Russia in Serbia, the United States in Haiti, for example) can also
offer outside authority if there is the political will to do so. Ultimately,
however, as I have already suggested, no one nation, itself defined by
sovereignty, can for long act as a surrogate for the missing international
enforcer. It certainly seems unlikely that any map, however tortured, can
bring peace to Armenia, Yugoslavia, or the Sudan in the absence of armed
enforcement. No lasting peace can exist without war, or its threat. Even
America failed to secure its multiculturalism in a setting of tolerance until
it had fought a bloody civil conflagration.
Yet, the presence of foreign peacekeepers, even where effective in the
short term (and often, it is not), cannot do more than buy time and a
provisional setting for long term internal solutions. Neither Haiti nor
Somalia proved responsive to external intercession. The American Civil
War set the stage for a reconstruction that failed to pay off on the promise
of justice. How much did Lincoln's battle for the American soul achieve?
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The struggle continues today: we are still two nations rather than one, a
house still divided by race, if not section. The proof ultimately is in the
internal, noncoercive settlement.
Some still think there is hope in economics, but as our discussion of
McWorld above suggested, economic markets, while they may attenuate the
sharpness of internecine divisions, do little to soften hatred or reduce the
sorts of deep-seated bigotry that lead to tribal war, ethnic cleansing, or
genocide. Germany's economic miracle and its leadership in the Common
Market did not translate into immunity against domestic violence or against
the rage aimed at foreigners. Its pop culture has proven as adept at
facilitating hate as in fostering unity-as the popularity of skinhead hate
rock groups suggests.
A civil religion of reciprocal rights and mutual respect is not to be
contrived from scratch, but must emerge out of civil institutions like public
schools, common work, communal customs, and a shared civic
consciousness-the very institutions that either have never taken root or
have failed in so many of Eastern Europe's disintegrating states. Law gives
legitimacy to a civil society, but cannot establish it, unless, as with common
law nations such as England, it has been a part of the civil fabric from the
start.
It is civil society and its supporting institutions that create the basis for
multiple identities-crosscutting cleavages that allow people to think of
neighbors, separated from them by ethnic or religious background, as
sharing other objectives and ends, the common values arising out of, for
example, union, parent-teacher association, or political party membership.
Difference needs not only to be offset against common membership, but also
understood as a claim to common membership: "As African-Americans, we
deserve equal respect and equal treatment before the law!" rather than an
argument for separation: "As Croatians, we deserve a country of our own!"
In America, difference has served to legitimize inclusion; in Europe, it has
too often served to rationalize exclusion. Our civic faith in "We the people"
as a formula for inclusion has much to do with whatever success Americans
have had.
Most important of all in establishing a viable constitutional faith,
however, is democracy itself, in Whitman's generic sense. Democratic civic
and cultural institutions put flesh on the bones of civic identity. They turn
mutual respect into a set of necessary political practices. More than
anything else, it has been the absence of a culture of democracy in Russia,
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Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia, Czechoslovakia, and all the other
disintegrating multicultural nations that has aided and abetted tendencies to
ethnic fragmentation and national dissolution. By the same token, it has
been in America, Canada, Belgium, and Switzerland that democratic civic
practices have held together peoples and tribes that have on their own been
little less vulnerable to the siren call of ethnicity than the Yugoslavs or the
Afghans. To the degree that the new Europe has ignored political
participation in favor of commercial and technological integration, it too
risks long-term failure.
As strategy, this suggests a need to reprioritize: put democracy first as
the foundation of civil society, and resistance to fragmentation may follow.
Ethnicity is unlikely to create a form of democracy that can contain and
limit it; democracy can create a form of ethnicity that is self-limiting. When
rights get taken seriously and are permitted to define individuals, it is easier
to attach them to minority ethnic groups under pressure and to persuade
majority ethnic groups that their own identity, expressed as exclusion, is in
violation of their civil faith. Putting democracy first means treating it as a
way of life and not just as a set of institutions. When democratic political
practice is rooted in membership in the community and empowers
community members in a larger civic polity, ethnic and religious traits grow
less crucial in forging a public identity. The American separation of church
and state not only protected the state from religion, it protected religion
from the state and from other rival religions, and thus strengthened it.
When liberal democracy separates public and private, it actually enlarges the
space for the exercise of private religion and ethnicity, while insulating them
from the baleful consequences of making them public--official intolerance,
for example.
Ethnicity is a healthy expression of identity which, however, like a
healthy cell, is susceptible to pathologies that turn the growth mechanism
against itself. The resulting cancer destroys not only the body around it (the
larger nation) but the cell itself (the ethnic entity). Democracy seems to be
ethnicity's immunological key-the source of its normalcy and its capacity
to control its own growth, so as to make it compatible with the growth of
other cells, and hence the basis for its ability to participate in the building
of a stable body politic. Perhaps the time has come for those states around
the globe falling into warring pieces to stop worrying about how to keep the
parts together and to start worrying about how to make the parts democratic;
to recognize that the true source of America's measured and all too partial,
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but still significant, success as a multicultural society, is its democratic civic
faith.
It may be that globalization, and with it, the globalization of law, are
more likely to succeed genuine democratization than the other way around.
It has often been remarked that democratic nations are less prone to make
war on each other than other kinds of nations, and whatever success Europe
has had has arisen out of its common democratic civic culture-certainly not
from its historically rival ethnic and national cultures. We noted at the
outset that law has played a powerfully integrating role in Europe, but I
would suggest this is a consequence of its democratic sensibilities.
A genuinely democratic Bosnia and a genuinely democratic Serbia might
not only cease to make war on Muslims or Croats, but might discover in
their democratic ideals and practices sufficient common ground to refashion
a confederation that would permit renewed civic coexistence. If the
democratic solution sounds improbable, think of the "realistic" solutions
currently being debated-whether expulsion, partition, dismemberment,
United Nations Trusteeship, or foreign intervention-and consider how
improbable it is that they will succeed in restoring sanity, let alone stability,
to peoples caught up in the spreading global fires of ethnic Jihad.
In a nation at war, Lincoln saw in democracy a last and best hope. On
our paradoxical planet today, with nations falling apart and coming together
at the same moment for some of the same reasons, and with toothless
international law hardly able to talk, let alone bite, democracy-however
frail, however demanding-may now have become our first and best chance.
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